

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

10 April 1976

File

Honorable Brent Scowcroft  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20510

25X1

Dear Brent:

Enclosed is a summary of the position I am taking on the current impasse involving termination payments under the program. Hopefully, I will be given an opportunity to present it to the Defense Subcommittee prior to the Easter recess.

25X1

In that connection, if the occasion presents itself, it would be most helpful if the President could cover this matter with any of the members of the Subcommittee. (Membership list attached).

We are in the process of pulling together from our field stations the total listing of all obligations involved. A detailed report on our finding will be transmitted as soon as possible.

In the event I am unable to persuade the Subcommittee of the merits of our position, it may be necessary for the Administration to proceed without their approval. There appears to be no question of the legality of such action and it is imperative that we fulfill our obligations.

I would welcome any suggestions on the attached draft.

Sincerely,

  
George Bush  
Director

MORI/CDF C02436030 page 1  
C03203925 Pages 2-6

Enclosure  
As stated

May Contain Congressional Material

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*Angola*

Dec. 30, 1976

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*Hyland, Matheny, et*

PM-REFUGEES 12-30

LUSAKA, ZAMBIA (UPI) -- REFUGEES ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FIGHTING BETWEEN CUBAN-BACKED GOVERNMENT FORCES AND REBEL GUERRILLAS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA ARE FLOODING INTO NEIGHBORING ZAMBIA, HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER AARON MILNER SAID TODAY.

MILNER SAID NEARLY 16,000 BLACK ANGOLANS HAD FLED SOUTHERN ANGOLA SINCE FEBRUARY AND IF THEY CONTINUED TO ARRIVE SEEKING SHELTER, ZAMBIA COULD BE FACED WITH "A VERY SERIOUS REFUGEE PROBLEM."

THIS MONTH, ABOUT 1,000 REFUGEES ARRIVED IN SOUTHERN ZAMBIA AND WERE TRANSFERRED TUESDAY TO THE MAKENI TRANSIT CAMP, SOUTH OF LUSAKA.

AN ANGOLAN STUDENT, HUDSON PETEPEET, 21, TOLD REPORTERS WHO VISITED THE CAMP WEDNESDAY, "WE HAD TO FLEE BECAUSE FIGHTING IS STILL GOING ON IN OUR COUNTRY AND MANY PEOPLE ARE DYING."

A GROUP OF ABOUT 700 BLACK TRIBESMEN FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA FLED INTO SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) THIS WEEK AND ALSO REPORTED CONTINUED CLASHES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND GUERRILLAS OF THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA.

MORE THAN 8,000 REFUGEES HAVE BEEN HOUSED IN TENT CAMPS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA IN THE PAST 10 MONTHS.

SINCE FEBRUARY, UNITA GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN FIGHTING A BUSH WAR IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, WHERE THE GROUP HAS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AMONG THE RURAL POPULATION, AND HAS VOWED TO CONTINUE FIGHTING UNTIL CUBAN TROOPS AND RUSSIAN ADVISERS HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY.

UNITA, WHICH HAD WESTERN BACKING IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, WAS DEFEATED BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA FOR CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF PORTUGUESE FORCES. THE SOVIET ADVISERS AND THOUSANDS OF CUBAN TROOPS BACKED THE MPLA.

PETEPEET SAID THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE USING ARMORED CARS, TANKS AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AGAINST UNITA FIGHTERS, WHO ALSO HAD "SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS."

ANOTHER REFUGEE, A FORMER CIVIL SERVANT FROM MAVINGA IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, SAID HE AND MANY OTHERS HAD TRAVELED ON FOOT FOR HUNDREDS OF MILES TO REACH ZAMBIA. THE GROUP HE WAS WITH LIVED MAINLY OFF WILD FRUIT AND KEPT AWAY FROM VILLAGES.

"WE HAD TO BE CAREFUL BECAUSE WE DID NOT KNOW WHICH VILLAGES SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT," HE SAID. "WE WERE FRIGHTENED ALL THE TIME OF BEING STOPPED AND TURNED OVER TO THE SOLDIERS."

UPI 12-30 07:00 AES

# Colombian Author Writes on Cuba's Angola Intervention

Colombian author Gabriel Garcia Marquez, who has made several trips to Cuba in the past two years and is friendly with Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, has written a lengthy account of Cuba's involvement in Angola based on numerous interviews in Cuba. An avowed Communist, Garcia Marquez, 48, is generally regarded as one of Latin America's major living writers.

His article is, in effect, the first Cuban-authorized version of the Angolan civil war. Yesterday the official Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina, distributed several large extracts of it in Spanish. The author has granted The Washington Post first publication rights in English. This is the first of three extracts.

In 1843, a female slave called Black Carlota had taken machete in hand to lead a slave uprising at the Tabacalera sugar mill, in the Matanzas region, and had been killed in the rebellion. In homage to her, the name of solidarity to Angola was named Operation Carlota.

It began with the sending of a reinforced battalion of special forces, made up of 650 men. They were flown over a span of 13 days from the military section of Jose Marti Airport in Havana to the airport at Luanda, still occupied by Portuguese troops.

Their mission was to launch back the offensive so the Angolan capital would not fall into enemy hands before the Portuguese left, and then to keep up the resistance until reinforcements could arrive by sea.

But the men on the first two flights were sure they were already too late, and the only hope they maintained was that they might be able to save Cabinda.

The first contingent left at 4 p.m. Nov. 7, on a special flight of Cubans de Aviacion, on one of the legendary Bristol Britania BB-214 turboprops that the English manufacturers had stopped making and the rest of the world had stopped using.

The passengers, who were not clearly that they numbered in the hundreds, that was the same as the first flight. The men on the Britania, though, carried Fidel Castro and his head to Cuba to launch a revolution, and the healthy look of tourist dressed by the Caribbean sun. They all wore summer clothes, with no military insignia, and carried briefcases and other personal effects with their real names and identification.

The members of the special battalion, which is not under the Revolutionary Armed Forces, are under the Ministry of the Interior, and well-trained warriors with a high level of political and ideological formation. Some hold college degrees, are voracious readers and occupy themselves

with intellectual pursuits. So the fiction of Sunday civilians should not have seemed a novelty to them.

But in their brief cases they carried machine pistols, and in the cargo hold of the plane, instead of baggage, there was a substantial load of light artillery, small arms, three 75 mm cannons and three 82 mm mortars. The only change that had been made in the plane, which carried two regular stewards, was a door cut in the floor so the weapons could be reached from the passenger compartment in case of emergency.

The flight from Havana to Luanda was made with a stop in Barbados to take on fuel, in the midst of a tropical storm, and a five-hour stop in Guinea-Bissau, mainly to wait for night.

Just as the first two planes arrived in Angola, three ships were leaving Cuba bringing an artillery regiment, a mechanized battalion and recoilless rifles; they would land in Angola Nov. 27.

On the other hand, the columns of Holden Roberto [head of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, a rival of the ultimately victorious Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] were so close that only hours before they had shot and killed an old native woman who was trying to reach the headquarters at Gran Farni, where the Cuban forces were concentrated.

So the men arriving on the two planes had no time to rest. They put on their olive-green uniforms, joined the ranks of the MPLA [the Popular Movement] and went into battle.

During nine months, the mobilization of human and material resources was a drama of daring. The decrepit Britanias, patched up with brakes from Soviet-made Ilyushin 12s, kept up a steady and almost unreal traffic.

Although their normal load is 18,000 pounds, they often flew with 194,000, which is off all the charts. The pilots, who normally fly 73 hours a month, sometimes flew more than 200. In general, each of the three Britanias in service carried two complete crews, who took turns during the flight, but one pilot remained staying in his seat 30 hours straight on a round trip, with 43 actual hours of flight. "There comes a time," he said with no attempt at heroics, "that you're so tired that you don't tire any more."

The route from Havana to Luanda is empty and unused. At the Britanias' cruising altitudes—between 18,000 and 20,000 feet—there is no information about winds in this day of the jet.

The pilots set off without knowing the weather along their course, flying at unusual altitudes to save fuel, and without the slightest idea of landing conditions.

Between Brazzaville and Luanda,

the most dangerous stretch, there was no alternative airport to fall back on. On top of everything else, the troops traveled with their weapons loaded and carried their explosives without their protective wrappings to cut down on weight.

The United States noted the Britanias' weak point: their range.

When Washington got the Barbados to bar refueling stops, the Cubans set up a transatlantic flight from Holguin, at the eastern end of Cuba, to the island of Sal, in Cape Verde.

It was a high-wire act without a net, for on the way out the planes arrived with fuel for only two more hours of flight and on the way back, because of headwinds, with only one hour's fuel left.

But even that circuit route was changed, to avoid endangering defenseless Cape Verde.

Then the cabins of the planes were modified to take four supplementary gasoline tanks, which allowed nonstop flights but with 30 fewer passengers, from Holguin to Brazzaville.

An intermediate solution, of making a stop in Guyana, did not work out for two reasons:

First, the runway was very short; second, Texaco, which holds the fuel contract in Guyana, refused to sell the fuel. Cuba tried to resolve this by sending a shipload of gasoline to Guyana, but through some incomprehensible accident the fuel was contaminated with water and dirt.

Despite these bitter setbacks, the government of Guyana was firm in its solidarity toward the Cubans until the ambassador of the United States personally threatened it with the bombardment and destruction of the airport at Georgetown.

Maintenance was done in less than half the usual time, and a pilot remembers flying without radar several times, although no one recalls any instrument failure. Under those inconceivable conditions, the Cubans made 101 flights until the end of the war.

The sea route was no less dramatic.

The only two passenger ships, of 4,000 tons each, wound up with dormitories in every open space, and latrines were set up in the lounge, the bars, the corridors.

The normal loading of 226 passengers was tripled on some voyages, and cargo ships designed to carry crews of 80 eventually were loaded with more than a thousand troops with armored cars, weapons and explosives.

Field kitchens were put up in holds and staterooms, and to save water disposable plates were used and yogurt containers served as glasses. The bilges were used for waste, and some 50 latrines were set up on deck.

The tired machinery of the older ships began to give out after six months of overuse, and this was the only complaint of the first troops to come back: Their long-awaited return was delayed for several days because of clogged filters on the (Cuban troopship) Viet Nam Heroico.

The other ships in the convoy had to wait for her, and some of the passengers then understood what Che Guevara meant when he said that the march of a guerrilla band is determined by the slowest man.

The problems were all the more annoying because ships were the target of all sorts of provocations by North American destroyers, which followed

(See INTERVENTION, Pg. 11-F)



WASHINGTON POST  
(PARADE) 9 JAN 1977 (10)

**WOMEN WANT SEA DUTY** Four women members of the U.S. Navy have filed suit in a class action. They allege that the legal prohibition against their assignment to sea duty deprives them of "the core experience of Navy life."

Navy women are currently permitted to serve on hospital ships and harbor vessels like tugboats but not on destroyers, cruisers, carriers and the rest.

WASHINGTON POST  
(PARADE) 9 JAN 1977 (10)

**DEAD DEAL** The Soviet Union has been trying for months to purchase from Great Britain its most powerful aero-engine, the Rolls-Royce RB-211, which provides 50,000 pounds of thrust to the jumbo jets.

The Soviets are building their first wide-body airliner, the Ilyushin 86, which will seat 350 passengers, and they want to study the RB-211.

The British are willing to sell a flock of the RB-211's to the Russians, but they want to control their production under license by the Soviets. They don't want to sell two or three and then have the Soviets pirate the engine with modifications.

In 1947 the British Labor government under Clement Attlee made the mistake of selling 55 Rolls-Royce Nene engines to the Soviets against the advice of its intelligence experts. The Soviets immediately began reproducing the engine illegally for their fighters and bombers. It was these fighters and bombers that were subsequently sent to North Korea to fight against U.S. aircraft in the Korean war.

The British are determined not to make the same mistake again. If they sell Rolls-Royce engines to the U.S.S.R., they want to provide substantial orders to the British aircraft industry. Otherwise --no deal.

Jack Anderson

WASHINGTON POST  
9 JANUARY 1977 (10) Pg. C7

## A Coup Against Mao's Memory

HONG KONG—The struggle for power in Peking, apparently, had all the ingredients of a Chinese opera. The participants in the drama behaved more as if they were engaged in the petty intrigues of a bygone dynasty than in the power politics of a modern state.

For an account of these fascinating events, we consulted Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and some of his top advisers. Then we flew to Hong Kong to talk to the China watchers on the scene.

What appears to have happened, as we reported in an earlier dispatch, was a posthumous coup against Mao Tse-tung. The old revolutionary was an unpredictable ruler who periodically sought to purify his own government with disruptive, revolutionary campaigns.

The most chaotic was the Cultural Revolution of 1966, a confrontation between the Red Guards and the Old Guards. Encouraged by Mao, young idealists mocked and mobbed senior government leaders. Some of the most powerful figures in China were subjected to public humiliation. Mao evidently thought this was good for their revolutionary souls, but the experience reportedly left them deeply embittered.

Mao used similar tactics to hold the military down. In 1971, he accused the former defense minister, Lin Biao, of plotting his overthrow. The army commanders suffered a severe loss of public prestige.

Thus, the senior bureaucrats and military commanders were left to stew in private. They would later join forces after his death. But meanwhile, in subtle ways characteristic of the Chinese, they resisted Mao's disruptions. They believed that practical policies and orderly development, rather than sheer ideological zeal, would be best for China.

By 1974, the bureaucrats had regained control of the government machinery. But Mao continued to crack the ideological whip through his wife, Chiang Ching, who exercised rigid, stifling control of the nation's cultural activities.

Some analysts believe the present Peking line that the ambitious Chiang manipulated Mao. But our sources are convinced that the ideological impetus, at least, came from the incurable old revolutionary himself. He also used Chang Chun-chiao, the chief political officer of the armed forces, to keep the military under submission, our sources report.

The late Premier Chou En-lai, the wily old pragmatist, groomed Teng Hsiao-ping to be his successor. This would have left the government in the hands of the senior bureaucrats, including victims of the Cultural Revolution and their sympathizers. Teng himself had been an ideological casualty.

But Chou was outmaneuvered in the backrooms of Peking by Chiang and her cohorts. Again, it is uncertain exactly what role Mao played in these manipulations. Some observers believe he had grown too old and incompetent to call the shots. There is evidence, certainly,

that he suffered lapses. But our sources believe he was lucid enough to maintain control. In any event, they say that Chiang tried to carry out the old man's mandate.

Thus Teng was brought down a second time. In his place, Mao named Hua Kuo-feng and sealed it with a handwritten note, declaring: "With you in charge, I'm at ease." The chairman's prestige was too enormous for anyone to challenge the choice.

The sudden, surprise selection of Hua last April, say our sources, was a triumph for Chiang. But it didn't last long. As Mao began to fade, the back-room intrigues intensified.

The top bureaucrats and military commanders, who had been alienated by Mao in the past, began conspiring together. The deposed Teng, for example, was consigned to a hot-springs resort outside Canton. Intelligence reports claim he got together there with Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying.

Mao had always taught that political power came out of the barrel of a gun. So Chiang, according to our sources, also sought the allegiance of the army. She made her play reportedly through the chief political officer, Chang Chun-chiao.

According to one account, she even tried to use her daughter, Li Na, to compromise the army. Chiang reportedly complained to Defense Minister Yeh that her daughter had been made pregnant by an army man and demanded that his son marry Li Na.

But by the time Mao died on Sept. 9, Hua reportedly recognized that the power was on the side of the senior bureaucrats and military commanders. He actively joined the opposition to the Maoists, who had brought him to power.

The contentious Chiang, according to a reliable report, telephoned Hua. "You want to throw me out when Chairman Mao's remains have not yet turned cold," she complained bitterly. "Is this the way to show your gratitude for the kindness rendered to you by Chairman Mao, who promoted you?"

The coup came less than a month after Mao's death. It was carried out by the Peking garrison on the night of Oct. 6. Members of Mao's family, who had been closest to him, were arrested separately.

The military political officer, Chang Chun-chiao, was arrested. So were two other loyalists who, together with the widow, have now been villified across China as the "gang of four." Our sources describe this group as Mao's true ideological heirs. The move against them, say our sources, constituted a military coup against the dead Mao.

There was strong personal hostility, they say, against the Maoists. The triumphant bureaucrats and army commanders, therefore, sought revenge against the young party workers who had humiliated them and, in some cases, displaced them 10 years ago.

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Angola

Part II -- Main Edition -- 11 January 1977

WASHINGTON POST - 11 JANUARY 1977 Pg 11

# Castro in the War Room: Tactical Advice to Angola

This is the second of three extracts from an article by the noted Latin American writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez, a Communist, giving the first Cuban-authorized account of the Angolan civil war:

Fidel Castro himself was keeping up to date on the smallest details of the war. He was at the send-off for each troop unit, and before it sailed he would call together the commanders into the theater at the Cabana. He would ask the commanders of the special forces battalion that went on the first flight, and drove them to the steps of the plane in his Soviet-made jeep. It is probable that then and in every one of the other farewells, Castro had to hide an envy for those going off to a war he could not be in.

By then, there was not a spot on the map of Angola that he could not identify, not a quirk of the land that he did not know by heart. So intensely and meticulously did he follow the war that he could cite any statistic of Angola as if he were talking about Cuba. He spoke of Angola's cities, its customs and its people as if he had lived there all his life.

At the start of the war, when the situation was especially pressing, he stayed in the general staff command room as long as 14 hours at a stretch, without eating or sleeping, as if he were on the campaign.

He followed the progress of battles, using colored indicators on wall-sized tactical maps, and was in constant contact with the battlefield high command, for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which Cuba had allied itself with.

Some of his reactions during those days of doubt reflected a certainty of victory, as when an UPLA unit was forced to dynamite a bridge to delay the advance of South African armored columns.

"Don't blow up any more bridges," Castro said in a message. "Otherwise you won't have any way to pursue them."

He was right: Only a few weeks later, the Angolan and Cuban engineering brigades had to repair 13 bridges in 20 days to catch the retreating invaders.

The difficulties of December were due in the first place to the tremendous firepower of the enemy, which by this time had received more than \$50 million in military aid from the United States. In the second place, they were due to Angola's delay in asking for help and the time it took to get the help to Angola.

Finally, they were due to the miserable conditions and cultural backwardness left by half a millennium of soulless colonialism. That, even more than the first two factors, posed the greatest obstacle to a decisive integration between the Cuban troops and the armed people of Angola.

In Angola, the Cubans found the same climate, the same weather, the same apocalyptic downpours and the same streets fragrant with molasses and the smell of the sea at home.

The Portuguese colonists had built beautiful, modern cities to live in, with air-conditioned glass buildings and stores with huge electric signs. But these were cities for whites, like those the gringos built around Old Havana. Beneath the mask of civilization lay a vast and rich land of misery: The natives' standard of living was one of the lowest in the world. Old superstitions not only complicated daily life, but also hindered the war effort. The Angolans had been convinced that bullets would not penetrate white skin, they feared the magic of airplanes and they refused to go into the trenches because they were only for the dead.

Angola was a dirty war in which one had to watch out as much for traps as for mercenaries, as much for cannibals as for guerrillas. A Cuban commander, in the midst of a battle, fell into an elephant trap.

At first, the black Africans, conditioned by gener-

ations of resentment against the Portuguese, were hostile to the white Cubans. Many times, especially in Cabinda, Cuban scouts felt betrayed by the primitive telegraph of the talking drums, whose thumping could be heard for as much as 20 miles.

South Africa's white troops, who fired on ambulances with 140 mm. cannons, threw up smoke-screens on the battlefield to collect their white dead, but left the black bodies for the vultures.

In Cuba, all the news coming from Angola was bad.

On Dec. 11, in Hengo, where the MPLA's armed South African invaders, a Cuban armored car with four officers in it set out along a path where some mines had been found.

Although four others cars had already passed through safely, the scouts advised against the route, which cut only a few unnecessary minutes off the trip. Ignoring the advice, the car was almost instantly blown up. Two special forces battalion commanders were gravely wounded, and Commandant Paul Diaz Arguello—commander of international operations in Angola, a hero of the struggle against Batista and a man widely loved in Cuba—died instantly.

That was the bitterest news for the Cubans, but it was not to be the last. The next day came the disaster at Catote, perhaps the worse set back of the entire war.

A South African column had managed to repair a bridge under the cover of the morning mists and had surprised the Cubans, who were in the midst of a withdrawal. The analysis of this defeat showed that it was due to an error on the Cubans' part.

On Dec. 22, at the closing of the party congress, Cuba gave its first official indication that it had troops in Angola.

The war was still not going well. Fidel Castro, in the closing speech, reported that the invaders in Cabinda had been defeated in 72 hours; that on the northern front the troops of Holden Roberto (leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola) who had been only 15 miles from Luanda on Nov. 10, had been forced to retreat to more than 60 miles away; and that South Africa's armored columns, which had advanced more than 400 miles, had been blocked more than 120 miles from Luanda. The detailed report was comforting, but it was far from a victory.

Cuban aid reached such a level that at one point there were 15 Cuban ships on the high seas bound for Luanda. The unstoppable offensive of the MPLA on all fronts turned the tide, once and for always, in its favor. In January, it was conducting operations originally planned for April.

(With a great disadvantage in air power) Angola did have a squadron of Mig-17s with Cuban pilots, but these were held in reserve by the high military command to be used only for the defense of Luanda.

After mid-March, the South African troops began their retreat.

On April 1, at 8:15 a.m., the advance of the MPLA troops under the command of Cuban commandant Leopoldo Cintrás Frias arrived at the dam at Raukana, next to the chicken-wire fence marking the frontier with Namibia. An hour and a quarter later the South African governor of Namibia, accompanied by two of his officers, asked permission to cross the border to begin talks with the MPLA.

Commandant Cintrás Frias received them in a wooden shed in the 10-yard-wide neutral strip between the two countries, and the two groups gathered around a large dining table.

Agreement took only two hours to reach, but the meeting lasted longer, for the South African general ordered a succulent dinner, prepared on the Namibian side. As they dined, he offered several toasts in beer.

(See CASTRO'S ADVICE, Pg 12-F)

Part II -- Main Edition -- 11 January 1977

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 7 JANUARY 1977(11) Pg 3

# Kremlin keeps jabbing at fabric of U.S. alliances

By Joseph C. Harsch

The biggest challenge facing the United States and its friends and allies during the year ahead will continue to be Soviet pressure on the fabric of the alliance. If anything, that pressure is likely to increase in scope and in intensity.

The liquidation of the alliance, by whatever means, is obviously the thing Moscow would most like to have happen. Were it to happen, Moscow would be king of the castle. Its will would be the strongest single thing in the world.

But if the alliance grows in vitality and security Moscow will continue to be what it is now, merely the second power in the world — and a fairly poor second at that. After all, it has no willing friend or ally anywhere in the world.

The United States is at the hub of a network of associations, friendships, and alliances which embrace all of the Americas except for Cuba, the lion's share of Africa, most of Islam, the Philippines, Japan, and, for the moment at least, China.

## PATTERN OF DIPLOMACY

### Stronger or weaker

The serious question is whether the fabric of that system of associations, friendships, and alliances will grow stronger or weaker during 1977. There can be no doubt that it will be under every form of pressure. It may even begin to tear, as it has in the past. But it is also stronger now than it was a year ago. President-Elect Carter has been handed the task of carrying on the good work of preserving and strengthening it, still further.

The form of pressure most obvious at the moment is the continued buildup of Soviet weapons. Most noticed by Europeans is the steady increase in the number of Soviet tanks deployed in Eastern Europe and presumably available for a possible thrust across the north German plain.

Naval authorities notice the steady rise in number of attack submarines which could in theory be used to cut the sea-lanes vital to American support of its allies in Western Europe and in Asia.

### Ballistic missiles

Strategic warfare specialists notice the continued deployment of new types of long range ballistic missiles. These include many presumably aimed at targets in Western Europe. The Soviets are also beginning to deploy movable missiles.

And there is much discussion over the extent to which they have built up defenses against nuclear attack.

Some of the most hawkish American experts insist that the Soviets now can protect most of their working population against nuclear weapons. If true this would mean that they are on the way to a "first strike" capability.

Perhaps the most dangerous thing about the weapons buildup is the doubt it sows in the minds of the allies about American ability and willingness to defend them. Is Moscow building weapons with an actual eye to war, or as a form of psychological warfare which could in theory give them the world without a single blow being struck? If it is the latter, then American hawks are playing directly into the hands of the Soviet propagandists. Europeans, listening to the "instant disaster" enthusiasts of Washington hawkdom, must already feel an inclination to head for Moscow to make what terms they can.

### A long way to go

The dominant opinion both in Washington and in major alliance capitals is that the Soviets are a long way from any "first strike" capability and have a long way to go to begin to match the overall strength of the United States and its allies.

However, there is no doubt that Soviet inferiority would be turned into effective superiority overnight if the alliance were to fall apart either from neglect, or from internal differences or from fear. Fear is perhaps the greatest single danger.

So what will Mr. Carter do to meet this challenge? He will have a number of important decisions to make almost immediately. Should the United States go ahead with the expensive B-1 bomber and build another super aircraft carrier? Or should it start building a fleet of fast, small ships designed to defend the sea-lanes and put its main reliance for deterrence on "cruise" missiles? The "cruise" missile is an unmanned, long-range, self-directing rocket which can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Confidence of the allies in the ability and will of the United States to support the alliance system will certainly be influenced by the soundness and convincingness of Mr. Carter's moves. To be effective they must express both firmness and prudence in military matters, and a proper awareness of economic factors as well. The alliance could be destroyed by economic folly as quickly as from insufficient weaponry.

It is therefore a good first step that the year has already opened with the granting of a loan to the British. This is intended to tide them over until the flow of North Sea oil can redress their imbalance in trade.

## CASTRO'S ADVICE - CONTINUED

Afterward, the program of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was agreed to by Castro and [Agostinho] Neto [leader of the MPLA] during their meeting March 14 in Conakry, after victory was achieved. They decided that the withdrawal would be gradual but that as many Cubans as needed would remain in Angola as long as needed to build a modern and strong army, able to guarantee the future internal security and independence of the country without outside help.

For security reasons, the Cuban press had not published any mention of the participation in Angola. But, as usually happens in Cuba, even with military subjects as delicate as this, the operation was a secret carefully kept by 8 million persons. The first congress of the Cuban Communist Party, which was to be held late in December and which was a sort of national obsession all year, took on a new dimension.

The volunteer units were formed was private messages to members of the first reserve, made up of all males between 17 and 25 and those who had been

members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. They were summoned by telegram to report to the appropriate military committees, with no word of why they were called. (The reason was so obvious that everyone who believed that he had military skills hastened to his military committee without waiting for a telegram. It took a great deal of effort to keep this mass concern from turning into a national disorder.)

Insofar as the emergency permitted, selection criteria were quite stringent: Not only were military qualifications and physical and moral condition taken into account, but also work background and political education.

Nevertheless, there were innumerable cases of volunteers trying to sneak through the filtering process. A qualified engineer tried to pass himself off as a truckdriver, a high official pretended to be a mechanic, a woman almost got away with passing herself off as a recent army recruit.

A youth who joined without his father's permission met his father in Angola, because his father had also gone without telling his family.

Part II -- Main Edition -- 12 January 1977

Angola

# Cuba in Africa:

WASHINGTON POST

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## Seed Che Planted

This is the last of three extracts from an article by the noted Latin American writer and prominent Communist Gabriel Garcia Marquez, giving the first Cuban-authorized account of the Angolan civil war:

Cuba's act of solidarity with Angola was far from a casual or impulsive act, but rather the end result of a continuous policy toward Africa by the Cuban revolution.

There was only one new or dramatic element in this delicate decision: This time it was not only a question of sending what aid it could, but taking on a large conventional war some 6,000 miles from its own territory, with the cost in blood and treasure incalculable and the political consequences unforeseeable.

The possibility that the United States might intervene openly, rather than through the mercenaries and South Africa as it had been doing for some time, was obviously one of the most disturbing unknowns. But a rapid analysis suggested that at least Washington would think twice about doing so:


It had just freed itself from the morass of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. It had a President no one had elected. The CIA was under fire in Congress and low-rated by public opinion. The United States needed to avoid seeming—not only in the eyes of African countries, but especially in the eyes of American blacks—to ally itself with racist South Africa. Beyond all this it was in the midst of an election campaign in its Bicentennial year.

Furthermore, Cuba was sure it could count on solidarity and material aid from the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, although it was also aware of the implications its action might hold for the policy of peaceful coexistence and international detente.

It was a decision of irreversible consequences, too large and complex to be resolved in 24 hours. Nonetheless, the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba had only 24 hours to decide, and it decided without flinching, in a large, calm meeting on Nov. 5. Far from what has so often been said, it was an independent and sovereign act of Cuba. Only after the decision was made, not before, was the Soviet Union informed.

Contacts between the Cuban revolution and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had been very intense since they first began in August of 1963, when Che Guevara fought alongside the guerrillas in the Congo. The following year MPLA leader Agostinho Neto himself went to Cuba, accompanied by Endo, the military commander of the MPLA, who was later killed in the hen.

In May 1975, as the Portuguese were getting ready to pull out of their African colonies, Cuban Commandant Flavio Bravo met Agostinho Neto in Brazzaville, and Neto requested help with shipment of arms and asked about the possibility of further more specific aid. As a result, Commandant Raul Diaz Arguillas led a civilian Cu-



The Washington Post

Where Angolan guerrillas were trained.

han delegation to Luanda three months later. Neto was more precise.... He asked Cuba to send instructors to open and run four military training camps.

Although the MPLA, which began in 1966, was Angola's oldest liberation movement and the only one with a broad popular base, and although it offered a social, political and economic program that suited the country's conditions, it was nonetheless the one in the weakest military position. It had Soviet arms, but lacked people trained to use them.

There was no assurance that the Portuguese military would let the Cuban instructors disembark. Only on July 16, 1975, when Cuba had received the first aid request from the MPLA, did Castro ask Portugal's Col. Oteio Saraiva de Carvalho (then a leftist member of the junta in Lisbon) to arrange Portuguese permission for Cuban aid to Angola. During that visit to Havana, Carvalho promised to see to it, but his answers had not yet arrived.

So when the (Cuban troopship) Viet Nam Heroico arrived in Puerto Amboim at 6:30 a.m. Oct. 4, and the Coral Island arrived on the 7th and the La Plata at Ponta Negra on the 11th, they docked without anyone's permission—but also without anyone's opposition.

The Cuban instructors were met by the MPLA and immediately set up the four training centers: one in Delatando, which the Portuguese had called Salazar, 180 miles east of Luanda; the second in Benguela, the Atlantic seaport; the third in Saorimo, formerly Enrique de Carvalho, in the remote deserted eastern province of Lunda, where the Portuguese had had a military base that they destroyed before abandoning it; and the fourth in the enclave of Cabinda.

Holden Roberto's troops of the op-

posing National Front (FNLA) were then so close to the Angolan capital, that a Cuban artillery instructor giving his students their first lessons at Delatando saw the armored cars of the mechanized brigade of regular South African troops crossed from Namibia, and three days later they had occupied the towns of Sa da Bandeira and Mocamedes without meeting any resistance.

It was a Sunday stroll. The South Africans had tape cassettes of lively music in their tanks. In the north, the leader of a mercenary column directed operations from a Honda sports car, beside a blonde who looked like a movie actress. They advanced as if they were on holiday, with no scouts out ahead, and they probably knew where the rocket came from that blew the car into bits. In the woman's overnight case there was only a party dress, a bikini and an invitation to the victory party Holden Roberto was already planning in Luanda...

By the end of the week, the South Africans had penetrated more than 350 miles into Angolan territory and were advancing toward Luanda at the rate of more than 40 miles a day. On Nov. 3, they attacked the lightly manned training camp for recruits in Benguela. The Cuban instructors, there had to break off their classes to lead their apprentice soldiers against the invaders, teaching them during lulls in battle...

The MPLA leaders, prepared for guerrilla war but not for large-scale conventional battles, then understood that their combined neighbors, equipped with the most rapacious and devastating resources of imperialism, could not be beaten without an urgent appeal to international solidarity.

By then there as not a single African liberation movement that had not counted on the solidarity of Cuba, sometimes in the form of arms and war materiel and other times in the form of training for military and civilian technicians and specialists. Mozambique since 1963, Guinea-Bissau since 1966, Cameroon and Sierra Leone all sought and received some expression of solidarity and aid from the Cubans at one time or another. Guinean President Sekou Toure threw back a mercenary landing with the aid of a Cuban unit... When Neto called on Angolan students in Portugal to go and study in socialist countries, Cuba welcomed many of them. All of them are now involved in the construction of socialism in Angola, some in very prominent positions (including the finance minister, head of the military academy, etc.).

Nothing demonstrates more clearly the length and depth of the Cuban presence in Africa than the fact that Che Guevara himself threw himself into the battles of the Congo at the peak of his career.

On April 25, 1965, he gave Fidel Castro a farewell letter resigning his rank as a commandant and everything (CUBA IN AFRICA, Pg 10-F)

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# A Friendly Signal to Castro Would Cost Carter Nothing

BY ERNEST CONINE

Reports keep cropping up that the Castro government in Cuba would like to reduce its role in Angola and concentrate on solving severe economic difficulties at home. If this is true, the stage may soon be set for a resumption of efforts to normalize U.S. relations with Cuba.

The two countries were edging cautiously toward negotiations until the Cuban dispatch of several thousand troops to Angola in the autumn of 1975, and Washington's understandably stiff reaction stopped the movement in its tracks.

In the context of time and circumstances, the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba and the attempt to isolate the Communist regime from normal contacts with other countries in the hemisphere made sense in the early 1960s.

As time went on, however, it became obvious that the Castro government would not go away, that danger from Havana-supported guerrilla movements in other Latin American countries was fading, and that U.S. policies actually were forcing Cuba into an ever greater dependence on the Soviet Union.

The Castro regime, for its part, could not escape the economic facts of life. The estrangement was denying Cuba advantageous access to American markets and American technology that was needed for its development efforts.

The first signs of a thaw came in 1972, when Washington and Havana negotiated an agreement providing for the extradition of American skyjackers landing in Cuba. But the real breakthrough came in the first eight months of 1975.

Premier Castro, on the occasion of a visit by Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) and a party of U.S. newsmen, talked a tough line—but made it unmistakably clear that he would welcome better relations. In his words, "We wish friendship. We belong to two different worlds, but we are neighbors. One way or another, we owe it to ourselves to live in peace."

Within weeks thereafter, the United States joined 15 other members of the Organization of American States in voting to remove the organization's collective sanctions against Cuba, and eased the restrictions on sales to Cuba by foreign subsidiaries of American companies.

Realists didn't expect that normal trade and diplomatic ties would be restored overnight, but it did appear that the two governments were nearing direct negotiations.

Then came the revelation that 15,000 or more Cuban troops had landed in Angola to insure the victory of the Marxist-oriented, Soviet-backed MPLA in that country's bloody, three-cornered power struggle.

President Ford called Castro an "international outlaw" for intervening in Angola, and warned that continued Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico would be considered an "unfriendly act." Castro called Ford a "vulgar liar," and announced his intention of extending military and political support to "progressive" movements wherever and whenever he chose.

In October, professing to believe that the United States was involved in the bombing of a Cuban airliner in which 73 people were

killed, Castro announced his intention of tearing up the anti-skyjacking agreement.

Experts point out, however, that in that very speech the Cuban leader was careful to suggest an interest in discussing a new agreement with Washington this year. Early in December, Raul Castro—minister of the armed forces and Fidel's younger brother—made a speech extending what was regarded as an olive branch to the incoming Carter administration.

These cautious signals—if they are indeed signals—coincide with reports of severe economic difficulties growing from a disastrous drop in sugar prices to little more than a tenth of the level prevailing two years ago. Despite attempts to diversify the economy, sugar accounts for 86% of Cuba's export earnings.

The consequences are being felt in the form of tighter rationing, drastic limits on imports of so-called luxury goods and a drag on development plans.

The economic situation is believed to be creating pressures for a withdrawal—or at least a big reduction—of the Cuban presence in southern Africa.

It is assumed that the Soviet Union foots most of the bill, in money terms, for maintenance of 14,000 to 18,000 Cuban soldiers—roughly 10% of the Cuban army—in Angola. But these soldiers possess technical skills that, though extremely valuable to the new Marxist government in Angola, are badly needed back home.

All the talk about a significant reduction in the Cuban role in Africa could turn out to be poppycock, of course. Cuban soldiers may yet end up fighting in Rhodesia or South-West Africa, in which case U.S.-Cuban relations will obviously become worse rather than better.

It could turn out, too, that while Castro genuinely wants improved relations and the economic advantages that such a movement would bring, he wants normalization only on his own terms. If taken at face value, some Cuban pronouncements suggest just that.

The Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, a high-level group that in a recent report urged Jimmy Carter to seek better relations with the Castro regime on a

## CUBA IN AFRICA - CONTINUED

else that tied him to the government of Cuba. On that same day, traveling alone, he took a commercial flight, using a false passport and a false name but not altering his appearance... carrying with him an attache case filled with literary works and inhalers for his incessant asthma, and killing his empty hours in hotel rooms with interminable solo games of chess.

Three months later, in the Congo, he joined 200 Cuban troops who had traveled from Havana in an arms ship. Che's mission was to train guerrillas for the National Revolutionary Council of the Congo, then battling Moise Tshombe, the puppet of the old Belgian colonists and the international mining companies...

For greater security (Che) was not listed as the head of the mission, so he was known by the nom-de-guerre of Tatu, Swahili for the number 2.

Che Guevara stayed in the Congo from April to December 1965, not only training guerrillas but also directing

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## 7 GROUPS ACT IN U.S. COURT TO BAR B-1 BOMBER FUNDS

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11 (UPI)—Seven national organizations asked a Federal court today to block additional funds for the supersonic B-1 bomber, alleging that the Defense Department and Air Force had failed to satisfy an environmental-impact study required by law.

The suit, in District Court, said a 1971 environmental-impact statement prepared by the Air Force did not consider alternatives to the controversial bomber and gave only superficial attention to the plane's impact upon air quality, noise levels and ozone levels in the stratosphere.

The Administration announced last month that it was going ahead with preliminary contracts on the bomber with the understanding that President-elect Carter will make the final decision on the plane's fate when he takes office.

The court order sought by three environmental organizations and four other groups could force suspension of Government spending for the project and block the awarding of additional contracts.

The suit was filed by the Environmental Action Foundation, Americans for Democratic Action, the Federation of American Scientists, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Friends of the Earth, Council on Economic Priorities, and Environmental Action Inc.

gradual and reciprocal basis, struck the right note.

Havana, the commission suggested, is entitled to expect Washington to lift the trade embargo and curb the activities of anti-Castro terrorists based in this country. In return, however, the United States has a right to expect the Cubans to restrain their own interventionist appetites—both in Africa and the Western Hemisphere.

It isn't clear what priority Carter will assign to an easing of the Cuban situation—or, indeed, to Latin America generally. But continuing the long estrangement of the United States and Cuba is in the interest of neither country.

The new President would lose nothing and risk nothing by quietly letting Castro know that his administration is ready and willing to work, step by step, toward a live-and-let-live accommodation. Then the next signal will be up to the man in Havana.

them in battle and fighting alongside them. His personal ties with Fidel Castro, about which there has been so much speculation, did not deteriorate at any time. The two kept up regular and cordial contacts through very efficient systems of communication.

When Moise Tshombe was defeated the Congolese asked the Cubans to withdraw, to make the armistice easier. Che Guevara left as he had come, without fanfare.

He took a commercial flight from Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania, burying his face in a book of chess problems during the entire six hours of flight. In the next seat his Cuban adjutant was kept busy entertaining, the political commissar of the army of Zanzibar, who was an old admirer of Che and spoke tirelessly of him throughout the flight, asking for the latest news of him and saying over and over how much he would like to see him again.

That fleeting, anonymous passage of Che Guevara through Africa planted a seed that no one could uproot.

Ernest Conine is a Times editorial writer.